PSHEbrighton Statement: The WellBN Safeguarding Failures — Who Knew What, and Why Was Action Not Taken Sooner?

10 October 2026

The evidence emerging from the employment tribunal in Redvers v NHS Sussex Integrated Care Board and Adam Doyle raises serious and increasingly urgent questions about how safeguarding and patient-safety concerns were handled within the local NHS, years before a subsequent investigation identified substantial failings in the treatment of children and young people at Brighton’s WellBN practice.¹

Reporting published by journalist Nick Wallis on 8 October describes how Dr Sarah Redvers, then a named GP safeguarding lead, raised concerns in August 2020 about the clinical practice of Dr Sam Hall, including questions about prescribing, professional competence, appropriate supervision and the safeguarding of vulnerable patients. Those concerns were escalated through NHS channels and subsequently referred to the General Medical Council (GMC).¹

According to the tribunal reporting, an investigation concluded in May 2021 that there were no causes for concern about Dr Hall’s practice. The assessment maintained that patients were receiving appropriate clinical assessments, that prescribing complied with professional guidance, and that monitoring and record-keeping met the required standards. In July 2021, the GMC closed its investigation without taking action.¹

Five years later, the findings of the NHS patient-safety investigation into WellBN presented a profoundly different picture.

Published in June 2026, that investigation identified serious deficiencies in the care of children and young people receiving gender-related treatment, including inadequate assessments, failures of clinical monitoring, shortcomings in informed consent and prescribing practices that did not meet appropriate professional standards. Seventy-eight children and young people were identified as potentially having experienced harm or being exposed to the risk of harm.²

The contrast demands an explanation.

How could concerns about clinical practice have been formally raised, investigated and apparently dismissed in 2020–21, only for a later investigation to identify serious deficiencies in the same area of healthcare? What evidence was examined in the earlier investigations, how were assurances obtained and verified, and why did those processes apparently fail to identify the problems subsequently uncovered?

These questions do not depend upon the outcome of Dr Redvers’s employment tribunal.

The tribunal is examining her allegations concerning the treatment she received after raising safeguarding concerns, including her claim that she was subjected to adverse treatment following accusations of transphobia. Those allegations remain contested and must be determined fairly, on the evidence, with full consideration of the respondents’ case. PSHEbrighton does not presume the tribunal’s findings.¹ ³

However, the established findings of the subsequent NHS patient-safety investigation raise a separate and legitimate question about the effectiveness of earlier clinical governance and regulatory oversight. Whatever the tribunal decides about Dr Redvers’s treatment, the discrepancy between the earlier assurances and the later findings requires proper scrutiny.

There is also a wider issue of institutional culture.

Safeguarding depends upon the ability of professionals to raise uncomfortable questions, challenge clinical assumptions and scrutinise practices that may expose vulnerable patients to harm. Allegations of discrimination must always be taken seriously and examined fairly. But an allegation of prejudice cannot, in itself, answer a substantive concern about patient safety. Nor should a professional’s willingness to question an established approach be treated as evidence of improper motivation.

Clinical safety and equality are not competing obligations. Both require objectivity, professional integrity and decisions grounded in evidence.

This matters particularly in Brighton & Hove, where PSHEbrighton has repeatedly sought greater clarity about safeguarding governance, institutional accountability and the lessons arising from WellBN.

The issue extends beyond the conduct of individual clinicians. It concerns the organisations responsible for responding to warnings, commissioning or conducting investigations, evaluating professional standards and ensuring that children and young people receive safe and appropriate care.

It also raises questions about the boundaries between institutional responsibilities. Where several organisations have some involvement in patient safety, professional regulation or safeguarding, the public is entitled to know who holds responsibility for examining concerns, following them through and ensuring that apparent assurances are supported by evidence.

PSHEbrighton therefore calls for a transparent and demonstrably independent examination of the outstanding organisational and safeguarding questions arising from WellBN, taking full account of the evidence emerging from the tribunal and the findings already established by the NHS investigation. The Government’s confirmation that regulatory and professional investigations were continuing, and its identification of WellBN as an outlier in national prescribing-data analysis, further underline the importance of obtaining a comprehensive account.⁴

Such an examination should establish when concerns were first received, which organisations and individuals were informed, what investigations followed, what evidence was available, how conclusions were reached, and whether the earlier processes were sufficiently rigorous and independent. It should also determine what action was taken subsequently, whether opportunities for earlier intervention were missed, and whether appropriate lessons have been identified and implemented.

This examination must be conducted without prejudicing the employment tribunal or any continuing professional regulatory proceedings. It should distinguish clearly between proven clinical shortcomings, unresolved allegations about individuals and wider questions of organisational responsibility.

Safeguarding systems are not judged simply by whether procedures exist, investigations are commissioned or reassuring conclusions are issued. They are judged by whether those procedures reliably identify risks, protect patients and enable professionals to act upon legitimate concerns.

An assurance that everything is satisfactory has little value if the underlying evidence has not been adequately tested.

The public should not have to choose between confidence in its healthcare institutions and the right to question their decisions. Genuine confidence depends upon openness, accountability and a willingness to acknowledge when earlier assessments may have been mistaken.

The WellBN investigation identified serious problems in the cases it examined. The emerging tribunal evidence raises the question of whether some of those problems could have been recognised and addressed substantially earlier.

Children’s safety must come before institutional reputation. Where warnings were raised, assurances given and serious deficiencies subsequently discovered, the public deserves more than an account of the procedures followed. It deserves an explanation of whether those procedures worked — and, if they did not, what is being done to ensure that such failures are not repeated.

That is the standard PSHEbrighton believes Brighton & Hove’s institutions must meet.


¹ Nick Wallis, “NHS knew of concerns about trans Dr in 2020”, GenderBlog, 8 October 2026.
² Brighton and Hove News, “Hove GP put kids at harm by prescribing hormones without proper assessment or monitoring, damning report finds”, 11 June 2026.
³ Tribunal Tweets, live reporting from the employment tribunal, October 2026.
⁴ Department of Health and Social Care, House of Lords Written Question HL2260, answered 28 July 2026.

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